HB+DB, mitigating man-in-the-middle attacks against HB+ with distance bounding

Authentication for resource-constrained devices is seen as one of the major challenges in current wireless communication networks. The HB+ protocol performs device authentication based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem and simple computational steps, that renders it suitable for resource-constrained devices such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. However, it has been shown that the HB+ protocol as well as many of its variants are vulnerable to a simple man-in-the-middle attack. We demonstrate that this attack could be mitigated using physical layer measures from distance-bounding and simple modifications to devices' radio receivers. Our hybrid solution (HB+DB) is shown to provide both effective distance-bounding using a lightweight HB+-based response function, and resistance against the man-in-the-middle attack to HB+. We provide experimental evaluation of our results as well as a brief discussion on practical requirements for secure implementation.

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