Eliciting risk preferences: text vs. graphical multiple price lists

We introduce new graphical displays that present binary choice lotteries via three dimensional rotating pie charts whose heights represent the prize amounts. We compare four graphical versions to the original text-only Holt & Laury (2002) multiple price list. Parametric and non-parametric measures of risk preferences are found to shift towards risk neutrality for the graphical displays.

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