Stability in Supply Chain Networks

This paper presents a theory of matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two-sided markets introduced by Gale and Shapley. Under natural restrictions, stable networks are guaranteed to exist. The set of stable networks is a lattice, with side-optimal stable networks at the extremes. Several other key results on two-sided matching also extend naturally to the more general setting.

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