On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games

We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a panel of biased experts. The decision-maker prefers to take an action in [0, 1] that matches the underlying state but relies on the experts to learn the state. Each expert has his `ideal` action or `agenda` and may conceal unfavorable information. If the decision- maker can select the panel members based on their agendas, what panel would she choose? While common intuition favors diverse panel (as experts would restrict each other`s ability to alter information), Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013) presents an example where a `homogeneous` panel (either all have agenda 0, or all have agenda 1) is more conducive to information revelation than a `diverse` panel (where one expert`s agenda is 0 the other`s is 1). We analyze the optimal diversity in expert panels and show that under mild conditions, a homogeneous panel is optimal when the experts observe the state independently of each other. But if the observability of the state is correlated across experts, diverse panel may be optimal. Hence, the diversity of agendas must be considered in conjunction with the diversity of information sources, and it is never optimal to seek diversity in both dimensions.

[1]  K. Ladha.  The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech and Correlated Votes , 1992 .

[2]  Huanxing Yang,et al.  Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information , 2013, Games Econ. Behav..

[3]  D. Austen-Smith.  Information transmission in debate , 1990 .

[4]  Ellen E. Sward,et al.  Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System , 1989 .

[5]  Wioletta Dziuda,et al.  Strategic argumentation , 2011, J. Econ. Theory.

[6]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  What the Seller Wont Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets , 2009 .

[7]  Competing with Equivocal Information , 2012 .

[8]  Jérôme Mathis.  Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion , 2008, J. Econ. Theory.

[9]  H. Shin.  The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion , 1994 .

[10]  Navin Kartik,et al.  Investment in concealable information by biased experts , 2017 .

[11]  Thomas W. Gilligan,et al.  Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures , 1987 .

[13]  Sourav Bhattacharya,et al.  Strategic Information Revelation When Experts Compete to Influence , 2011 .

[14]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[15]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Relying on the Information of Interested Parties , 1985 .

[16]  Y. K. Kwon,et al.  Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of Managers , 1988 .

[17]  Eddie Dekel,et al.  Disclosure and Choice , 2018 .

[18]  Frédéric Koessler,et al.  Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure , 2014 .

[19]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Strategic Information Revelation , 1990 .

[20]  Sergiu Hart,et al.  Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment , 2017 .

[21]  A. Ambrus,et al.  Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces , 2008 .

[22]  Navin Kartik,et al.  Multi-Sender Disclosure of Verifiable Information ∗ , 2014 .

[23]  Francesco Giovannoni,et al.  Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[24]  Abhijit Banerjee,et al.  A Simple Model of Voice , 2001 .

[25]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Quality Testing and Disclosure , 1985 .

[26]  Ying Chen,et al.  Effective Persuasion , 2014 .

[27]  Emir Kamenica,et al.  Bayesian Persuasion , 2009, World Scientific Series in Economic Theory.

[28]  On the Composition of Committees , 2004 .

[29]  Sanford J. Grossman.  The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality , 1981, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[30]  O. Swank,et al.  On the Composition of Committees , 2003 .

[31]  Itai Sher,et al.  Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion , 2011, Games Econ. Behav..

[32]  J. Morgan,et al.  A Model of Expertise , 1999 .

[33]  Matthew Gentzkow,et al.  Competition in Persuasion , 2011 .

[34]  R. Dye.  DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATION , 1985 .

[35]  Barton L. Lipman,et al.  Current Draft , 1994 .

[36]  A. Rubinstein,et al.  On Optimal Rules of Persuasion , 2004 .

[37]  Shih En Lu,et al.  Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders , 2014, Games Econ. Behav..

[38]  Daniel J. Seidmann,et al.  Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages , 1997 .

[39]  Asher Wolinsky,et al.  Eliciting information from multiple experts , 2002, Games Econ. Behav..

[40]  Sourav Bhattacharya,et al.  Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence , 2013 .

[41]  M. Bagnoli,et al.  Log-concave probability and its applications , 2004 .

[42]  Mathias Dewatripont,et al.  Advocates , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.

[43]  Jonathan Newton.  Cheap Talk and Editorial Control , 2014 .

[44]  Hyun Song Shin,et al.  Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration , 1998 .

[45]  Thomas W. Gilligan,et al.  Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee , 2016 .

[46]  Marco Battaglini,et al.  Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , 2002 .

[47]  V. Krishna,et al.  Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments , 2001, American Political Science Review.

[48]  K. Hagerty,et al.  The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure , 1990 .

[49]  Hongbin Cai,et al.  Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees , 2009 .

[50]  Barton L. Lipman,et al.  Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness , 2019, Econometrica.

[51]  Moti Lal Tiku,et al.  Robust Inference , 1986 .

[52]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach , 2006 .

[53]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications , 1981 .

[54]  D. Austen-Smith.  Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule , 1993 .

[55]  Eduardo Perez-Richet.  Competing with Equivocal Information , 2012 .

[56]  S. Shavell.  Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale , 1994 .