From spectrum management to spectrum governance

Spectrum management is essentially an issue of coordination for which different solutions are possible. Two alternative approaches have been proposed to replace or to be applied next to governmental control: (1) property rights; and (2) a commons, with restrictions in the type of use or users. Although elements of both proposals have been implemented, the resulting mixed regime is still a top down process with many rigidities and a government in control. Proper implementation of these alternative approaches requires a shift in the role of the government from a controller of the spectrum management process to a facilitator of decentralized coordination in the market in a multi-actor spectrum governance process. The role of the government shifts to market design, monitoring and facilitation. This shift in the role of the government is relatively absent in the debate on spectrum management.This paper makes a proposal for this shifting role of the government, provides the rationale for this shift and includes guidance on its implementation. A case study on recent experience in the Netherlands with this new role of the government is summarized in this paper. The case study describes how this role of the government could be implemented for the introduction of new (cognitive radio) technology.

[1]  Peter Anker,et al.  Achieving Alignment between Institutions and Technology, the Case of Radio Spectrum , 2013 .

[2]  David B. Audretsch,et al.  Competition policy in dynamic markets , 2001 .

[3]  P. Stern.  Design principles for global commons: Natural resources and emerging technologies , 2011 .

[4]  R. C. Kirby,et al.  History and trends in international radio regulation , 1995 .

[5]  Martin Cave,et al.  Essentials of Modern Spectrum Management: Frontmatter , 2007 .

[6]  Peter Anker,et al.  Cognitive Radio, the Market and the Regulator , 2010, 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN).

[7]  Peter Anker,et al.  Does Cognitive Radio Need Policy Innovation? , 2010 .

[8]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Will Lessons from Small-Scale Social Dilemmas Scale Up? , 2008 .

[9]  A. Michaelis.  From semaphore to satellite , 1965 .

[10]  David Barquero,et al.  Next Generation Mobile Broadcasting , 2013 .

[11]  Ronald H. Coase,et al.  The Federal Communications Commission , 1959, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[12]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources , 1994 .

[13]  Ir. Wolter Lemstra,et al.  Cognitive Radio: Enabling Technology in Need of Coordination , 2011 .

[14]  Benoit Pierre Freyens,et al.  Policy objectives and spectrum rights for future network developments , 2015, 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN).

[15]  Benoit Pierre Freyens.  A policy spectrum for spectrum economics , 2009, Inf. Econ. Policy.

[16]  Roger Ware,et al.  Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach , 1999 .

[17]  Victoria M. Edwards,et al.  Platforms for collective action in multiple-use common-pool resources , 1999 .

[18]  J. Groenewegen,et al.  Institutional Economics: An Introduction , 2010 .

[19]  M. Cave,et al.  Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice , 1999 .

[20]  Coleman Bazelon.  Too many goals: Problems with the 700 MHz auction , 2009, Inf. Econ. Policy.

[21]  G. Codding,et al.  The International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in International Co-operation. , 1953 .

[22]  Gerald R. Faulhaber.  The Question of Spectrum: Technology, Management, and Regime Change , 2005, J. Telecommun. High Technol. Law.

[23]  Massimo Motta,et al.  Competition Policy: Theory and Practice , 2004 .

[24]  P. Klemperer.  What Really Matters in Auction Design , 2001 .

[25]  Taoka Hidekazu,et al.  Scenarios for 5G mobile and wireless communications: the vision of the METIS project , 2014, IEEE Communications Magazine.