Inequity aversion and the evolution of cooperation

Evolution of cooperation is a widely studied problem in biology, social science, economics, and artificial intelligence. Most of the existing approaches that explain cooperation rely on some notion of direct or indirect reciprocity. These reciprocity based models assume agents recognize their partner and know their previous interactions, which requires advanced cognitive abilities. In this paper we are interested in developing a model that produces cooperation without requiring any explicit memory of previous game plays. Our model is based on the notion of inequity aversion, a concept introduced within behavioral economics, whereby individuals care about payoff equality in outcomes. Here we explore the effect of using income inequality to guide partner selection and interaction. We study our model by considering both the well-mixed and the spatially structured population and present the conditions under which cooperation becomes dominant. Our results support the hypothesis that inequity aversion promotes cooperative relationship among nonkin.

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