论文信息 - Degree of Manipulability of Known Social Choice Rules in the Case of Multiple Choice - 字舞流文

Degree of Manipulability of Known Social Choice Rules in the Case of Multiple Choice

T Aleskerov Fuad | Karabekyan Daniel | I Yakuba Vyacheslav | M R Sanver

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