Towards system-level adversary attack surface modeling for microelectronics trust

Models of trust for microelectronic systems are difficult to create due to the large variety of adversarial strategies available. Building on previous work, we present a new adversary model that considers the large heterogeneous attack surface that is realistically available on a diverse microelectronic system. We also present an expanded game theoretic model that permits reasoning about optimal adversarial and defensive strategies across this varied attack surface.

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