Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] J. Laffont. Fundamentals of public economics , 1988 .
[2] E. Maskin,et al. A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms , 1980 .
[3] Jacques Crémer,et al. Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation , 1990 .
[4] C. d'Aspremont,et al. Incentives and incomplete information , 1979 .
[5] Steven R. Williams,et al. Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain , 1995 .
[6] P. Reny,et al. Correlated Information and Mechanism Design , 1992 .
[7] Thomas R. Palfrey,et al. Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms , 1994 .
[8] Hitoshi Matsushima,et al. Efficiency in partnerships , 1991 .
[9] M. Satterthwaite,et al. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .
[10] E. Maskin. Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms , 1984 .
[11] Richard P. McLean,et al. FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS , 1988 .
[12] D. Fudenberg,et al. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information , 2022 .
[13] Jacques Cr. Incentives and the Existence of Pareto-Optimal Revelation Mechanisms , 1990 .
[14] R. McAfee,et al. Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction , 1989 .