Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton-DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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