论文信息 - Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders

Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders

Abstract We derive the optimal bid functions for discriminatory and competitive multi-unit private value auctions, assuming bidders act as price-takers. The results suggest that the competitive auction is superior to the discriminatory auction, both in terms of efficiency and simplicity.

Dieter Nautz

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