论文信息 - Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions

Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions

We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private value.

Eddie Dekel | Asher Wolinsky | A. Wolinsky | Eddie Dekel

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