Explaining Deductive Inference

We naturally take for granted that by performing inferences we can obtain evidence or grounds for assertions that we make. But logic should explain how this comes about. Why do some inferences give us grounds for their conclusions? Not all inferences have that power. My first aim here is to draw attention to this fundamental but quite neglected question. It seems not to be easily answered without reconsidering or reconstructing the main concepts involved, that is, the concepts of ground and inference. Secondly, I suggest such a reconstruction, the main idea of which is that to make an inference is not only to assert a conclusion claiming that it is supported by a number of premisses, but is also to operate on the grounds that one assumes or takes oneself to have for the premisses. An inference is thus individuated not only by its premisses and conclusion but also by a particular operation. A valid inference can then be defined as one where the involved operation results in a ground for the conclusion when applied to grounds for the premisses. It then becomes a conceptual truth that a valid inference does give a ground for the conclusion provided that one has grounds for the premisses.

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