Competition in a Multimarket Environment: The Case of Market Exit

Studies of competition typically have two underlying assumptions: that competition occurs within the boundaries of industries or markets and that all firms in a market or industry are affected equally by competitive pressures. The concept of multipoint competition challenges both assumptions. Multipoint theory addresses how different levels of contact between firms across multiple markets affect competition in individual markets. Its main argument is that high levels of contact between firms across markets will induce mutual forbearance, causing multipoint competitors to refrain from aggressively attacking each other.The restraint stems from the fact that high levels of intermarket contact enable a firm to respond to an aggressive action by a multipoint rival in markets other than the one in which the action takes place. That possibility raises the potential costs of aggressive moves and serves as a credible deterrent, especially if a firm can respond in several markets. In addition, multipoint competition helps firms to interpret their rivals' intentions and signal their own, reducing the likelihood of costly misunderstandings.The authors elaborate on those ideas to examine how a hospital's degree of intermarket contact with its competitors in a particular service market affects the likelihood that it will exit that market. They find that hospitals are less likely to exit markets in which they meet large numbers of their multipoint rivals. As a result of mutual forbearance, competitive rivalry is reduced across the markets that multipoint rivals share, lessening the types of pressures that typically prompt market exit. With lower levels of competitive rivalry, markets shared by multipoint rivals are relatively more hospitable environments in which to operate and are less likely to be exited. Rather than competing intensely, multipoint rivals appear to adopt a “live and let live” approach toward each other.The fact that multipoint contact across markets may lessen competitive pressures within individual markets has implications for the contact between firms in several settings. Multimarket contact can occur across different product or service markets and also across different geographic markets, thus affording an intriguing perspective for the investigation of the rivalry between emerging transnational firms. True transnationals, by successfully integrating global operations while still addressing local market concerns, have been seen by some as having the capabilities necessary for successful performance in international competition. Perhaps transnational firms, because they have an integrated decision-making structure, can coordinate their actions to reduce competitive rivalry with each other across the markets they share. If so, markets dominated by transnationals may become more stable than the current state of international competition would predict.

[1]  S M Shortell,et al.  Effects of competition, regulation, and corporatization on hospital-physician relationships. , 1986, Journal of health and social behavior.

[2]  K. Judd Credible Spatial Preemption , 1985 .

[3]  J. Brockner The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical Progress , 1992 .

[4]  S. Zeger,et al.  Longitudinal data analysis using generalized linear models , 1986 .

[5]  Warren B. Brown,et al.  Successor Type and Organizational Change in the Corporate Enterprise. , 1972 .

[6]  W. P. Barnett,et al.  Strategic Deterrence Among Multipoint Competitors , 1993 .

[7]  J. Tirole The Theory of Industrial Organization , 1988 .

[8]  M. Wiersema,et al.  Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change , 1992 .

[9]  Richard A. D'Aveni,et al.  Complex Patterns of Vertical Integration in the Forest Products Industry: Systematic and Bankruptcy Risks , 1992 .

[10]  Warren Boeker,et al.  PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESSOR CHOICE: THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP , 1993 .

[11]  Glenn R. Carroll,et al.  A sociological view on why firms differ , 1993 .

[12]  M. Fennell The effects of environmental characteristics on the structure of hospital clusters. , 1980, Administrative science quarterly.

[13]  MillerDanny Stale in the Saddle , 1991 .

[14]  M. Tushman,et al.  Organizational Evolution: A Metamorphosis Model of Convergence and Reorientation , 1985 .

[15]  N. Fligstein,et al.  The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 1919–1979 , 1985 .

[16]  J. Pfeffer,et al.  The Power and the Glory@@@Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. , 1992 .

[17]  D. Hambrick,et al.  The seasons of a CEO's tenure. , 1991, Academy of management review. Academy of Management.

[18]  Lynne G. Zucker,et al.  NORMAL CHANGE OR RISKY BUSINESS: INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON THE ‘HAZARD’ OF CHANGE IN HOSPITAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1959–79[1] , 1987 .

[19]  C. D. Edwards,et al.  Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power , 1955 .

[20]  B. Wernerfelt,et al.  Multiple point competition , 1985 .

[21]  W. Dugger The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[22]  Ming-Jer Chen,et al.  Nonresponse and Delayed Response to Competitive Moves: The Roles of Competitor Dependence and Action Irreversibility , 1992 .

[23]  M. Porter Please Note Location of Nearest Exit , 1976 .

[24]  Multi-Market Interdependence and Local Market Competition in Banking , 1978 .

[25]  O. Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting , 1985 .

[26]  Roice D. Luke,et al.  Strategic choices for America's hospitals : managing change in turbulent times , 1989 .

[27]  Jeffrey Pfeffer,et al.  Organizational demography and turnover in top-management groups. , 1984 .

[28]  John A. Pearce,et al.  Strategic Flexibility: A Management Guide for Changing Times , 1985 .

[29]  M. Lee,et al.  A Conspicuous Production Theory of Hospital Behavior , 1971 .

[30]  John T. Scott Multimarket Contact and Economic Performance , 1982 .

[31]  Marvin B. Lieberman,et al.  Exit from Declining Industries: "Shakeout" or "Stakeout"? , 1990 .

[32]  Steven B. Andrews,et al.  Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition , 1995, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Research Design.

[33]  W. Boeker,et al.  Turbulence at the top: a new perspective on governance structure changes and strategic change. , 1991, Academy of Management journal. Academy of Management.

[34]  Kirk Monteverde,et al.  You have printed the following article : Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry , 2007 .

[35]  Alan D. Meyer,et al.  ENVIRONMENTAL JOLTS AND INDUSTRY REVOLUTIONS: ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO DISCONTINUOUS CHANGE , 1990 .

[36]  Kanak Gautam,et al.  The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change , 1994 .

[37]  R. Burt Cooptive Corporate Actor Networks: A Reconsideration of Interlocking Directorates Involving American Manufacturing , 1980 .

[38]  Barry M. Staw,et al.  Threat-rigidity effects in organizational behavior: A multilevel analysis. , 1981 .

[39]  Frances J. Milliken,et al.  The role of managerial learning and interpretation in strategic persistence and reorientation: An empirical exploration , 1992 .

[40]  David J. Miller,et al.  Stale in the Saddle: CEO Tenure and the Match Between Organization and Environment , 1991 .

[41]  C. Prahalad,et al.  The Core Competence of the Corporation , 1990 .

[42]  S. Bradley,et al.  Outsourcing and industrial decline , 1992 .

[43]  John H. Grant,et al.  FACTORS INFLUENCING DIVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD STUDY , 1982 .

[44]  R. Burt Toward a structural theory of action , 1982 .

[45]  Heather A. Haveman Organizational size and change: Diversification in the savings and loan industry after deregulation , 1993 .

[46]  S. Jackson,et al.  Top management and innovations in banking: Does the composition of the top team make a difference? , 1989 .

[47]  Terry L. Amburgey,et al.  Strategic momentum: The effects of repetitive, positional, and contextual momentum on merger activity , 1992 .

[48]  Javier Gimeno Multipoint competition, market rivalry and firm performance: A test of the mutual forbearance hypothesis in the United States airline industry, 1984--1988 , 1994 .

[49]  C. Bartlett,et al.  Managing across Borders: The Transnational Solution , 1990 .

[50]  L. Vogel,et al.  Strategy and Structure , 1986 .

[51]  Joseph T. Mahoney,et al.  The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration , 1992 .