GAME THEORY AND INTERFERENCE AVOIDANCE IN DECENTRALIZED NETWORKS

In networks with transmitting users having separate uncoordinated receivers, waveform adaptation by greedy interference avoidance (IA) algorithms ([1], [2] and [3]) might not lead to fair network resource allocations. A game theoretic framework for this scenario, based on Potential game theory is presented in this paper. This model provides insight into development of algorithms that are fairer than the greedy IA algorithms and are amenable to distributed implementations.

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