Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior

This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstating is useless but the replacement heuristics is consequential. The paper argues that the “replacing” manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior, and study its effects. The conclusion is that the Alternative Vote should not be considered as immune to manipulation.

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