Hiding traffic flow in communication networks

The authors consider hiding traffic flow on a communication network from an outside eavesdropper. It is assumed that the eavesdropper can detect transmissions, but cannot understand the encrypted messages being sent. The solution proposed for the network is to choose a transmitter activation schedule independent of the traffic demand, and to use this schedule for all data transfers. For the spread spectrum broadcast model, the authors analyze the cost of using this scheme, as reflected in a possible reduction of throughput.<<ETX>>

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