Analysing User Deviations in Interactive Safety-Critical Applications

Usability and safety problems have often been addressed separately in designing interactive safety-critical applications thus obtaining fragmented results. In this paper we present a method to analyse possible deviations of users in performing their activities in order to elicit safety requirements and to improve design of interactive safety-critical applications. An application of the proposed method to a case study in the Air Traffic Control domain is discussed.

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