Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information

We study subgame perfect implementation through perfect information mechanisms in economic environments. We assume that worst bundles exist for each agent and can be assigned to them independently of the bundle assigned to at least one other agent. We restrict our attention to allocation rules that are anonymous, efficient on their own range, single-valued in welfare, and that induce agents' participation. We define a class of mechanisms, which satisfy properties of minimal path length and finiteness of message dimensions. We characterize the class of allocation rules which can be implemented through those mechanisms.

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