Gagnon’s critique of the conflict as a result of Balkan leaders trying to cement their power in response to the rise of “political pluralism” and “popular mobilization” within

Benjamin MacDonald POL 408 In 1991, many observers saw the destruction of the “iron curtain” as more than just the termination of an infamous ideology—communism, but also as the beginning of a “New World Order”, with free-market capitalism and liberal democracy becoming the norm, spreading across the globe. Some Western scholars expanded this notion and stated that it was “the end of history”. However, such observations soon proved to be fallacious, for ethnic strife quickly erupted in their own “backyard”—the formerYugoslavia. Indeed, the triumphant euphoria expressed by many was quickly replaced by sober realism: the cumulative statistics over the course of three “Balkans” wars has led to over 200,000 deaths, three million people displaced, and not to mention, has left the region’s economy devastated. All in all, the world has not witnessed such dislocation and ethnic cleansing of this magnitude since Hitler carried out his “Final Solution”. Accordingly, many Westerners are quick to view these wars as an expression of ancient “ethnic enmities”, which were “naturally” manifested after the “strong arm” of communism vanished. However, I argue this approach is false. This is because their causes were modern, and thus, had nothing to do with the region’s so-called “tribal past”. Furthermore, the other two approaches help explain why. A second more amenable narrative on the Balkan conflicts is what social scientists call, a constructivist approach, which adheres to the belief that social realities happen because of human beings, who “invent”—or “construct”—ways to frame issues and events. Moreover, the ways they caricature these issues have a profound impact on