The Moderating Effect of Solidarity as Conduct: A Theoretical and Empirical Perspective

This article takes a fresh look at a long-standing, meta-theoretical framework: the “Structure Conduct Performance” model. Utilized to understand marketing through organizational economics, this model has exerted a powerful influence on the marketing discipline. After specifying a refined configuration of the model where solidarity is interpreted as both a form of cohesive conduct and a moderator variable, the authors test the proposed model within a franchise setting and discuss their findings. The results offer new insight toward understanding the marketing exchange processes in hierarchical, interorganizational environments.

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