OMG: How Much Should I Pay Bob in Truthful Online Mobile Crowdsourced Sensing?

Mobile crowdsourced sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect data, enabling numerous novel applications. To achieve good service quality for a MCS application, incentive mechanisms are necessary to attract more user participation. Most of existing mechanisms apply only for the offline scenario where all users' information are known a priori. On the contrary, we focus on a more real scenario where users arrive one by one online in a random order. We model the problem as an online auction in which the users submit their private types to the crowdsourcer over time, and the crowdsourcer aims to select a subset of users before a specified deadline for maximizing the total value of the services provided by selected users under a budget constraint. We design two online mechanisms, OMZ and OMG, satisfying the computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty and constant competitiveness under the zero arrival-departure interval case and a more general case, respectively. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our online mechanisms.

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