Analysis of countermeasures against access driven cache attacks on AES

Cache based attacks (CBA) exploit the different access times of main memory and cache memory to determine information about internal states of cryptographic algorithms. CBAs turn out to be very powerful attacks even in practice. In this paper we present a general and strong model to analyze the security against CBAs. We introduce the notions of information leakage and resistance to analyze the security of several implementations of AES. Furthermore, we analyze how to use random permutations to protect against CBAs. By providing a successful attack on an AES implementation protected by random permutations we show that random permutations used in a straightforward manner are not enough to protect against CBAs. Hence, to improve upon the security provided by random permutations, we describe the property a permutation must have in order to prevent the leakage of some key bits through CBAs.

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