There is a heterogeneous resource that contains both good parts and bad parts, for example, a cake with some parts burnt, or a land-estate with some parts polluted. The resource has to be divided fairly among n agents, each of whom has a personal value-density function on the resource. The value-density functions can accept any real value positive or negative. Can standard cake-cutting procedures, developed for positive valuations, be adapted to this setting? This paper focuses on the question of envyfree cake-cutting with connected pieces. It is proved that such a division exists for 3 agents. The proof uses a generalization of Sperner’s lemma, which may be of independent interest.
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