Betrayal Aversion

Due to betrayal aversion, people take risks less willingly when the agent of uncertainty is another person rather than nature. Individuals in six countries (Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States) confronted a binary-choice trust game or a risky decision offering the same payoffs and probabilities. Risk acceptance was calibrated by asking individuals their " minimum acceptable probability " (MAP) for securing the high payoff that would make them willing to accept the risky rather than the sure payoff. People's MAPs are generally higher when another person rather than nature determines the outcome. This indicates betrayal aversion. (JEL C72, C91)

[1]  Measuring trust: An experiment in Brazil , 2004 .

[2]  Sandra L. Robinson,et al.  The development of psychological contract breach and violation: a longitudinal study , 2000 .

[3]  E. Fehr A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation , 1998 .

[4]  Max H. Bazerman,et al.  Bounded awareness: what you fail to see can hurt you , 2007 .

[5]  Christopher K. Hsee,et al.  Culture and Individual Judgment and Decision Making , 2008 .

[6]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  Oxytocin increases trust in humans , 2005, Nature.

[7]  C. Frith Social cognition , 2008, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.

[8]  Colin Camerer,et al.  EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF A SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM REPUTATION MODEL , 1988 .

[9]  Rachel T. A. Croson,et al.  Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games , 1999 .

[10]  Rachel T. A. Croson,et al.  Gender Differences in Preferences , 2009 .

[11]  D. Ellsberg Decision, probability, and utility: Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms , 1961 .

[12]  F. Heider The psychology of interpersonal relations , 1958 .

[13]  Ernst Fehr,et al.  Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity , 2001 .

[14]  P. Slovic Perception of risk. , 1987, Science.

[15]  R. Zeckhauser,et al.  Trust, Risk and Betrayal , 2003 .

[16]  S. Blount When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences , 1995 .

[17]  V. Smith,et al.  Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games , 2003 .

[18]  John H. Miller,et al.  NOTES AND COMMENTS GIVING ACCORDING TO GARP: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE CONSISTENCY OF PREFERENCES FOR ALTRUISM , 2002 .

[19]  Gary E. Bolton,et al.  ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition , 2000 .

[20]  J. Pratt RISK AVERSION IN THE SMALL AND IN THE LARGE11This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (grant NSF-G24035). Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. , 1964 .

[21]  Andrei Shleifer,et al.  Trust in Large Organizations , 1996 .

[22]  Catherine C. Eckel,et al.  Is Trust a Risky Decision? , 2004 .

[23]  Armin Falk,et al.  A Theory of Reciprocity , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[24]  K. Arrow Essays in the theory of risk-bearing , 1958 .

[25]  David M. Kreps Corporate culture and economic theory , 1990 .

[26]  Martin Dufwenberg,et al.  A theory of sequential reciprocity , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[27]  I. Bohnet,et al.  Decomposing trust and trustworthiness , 2006 .

[28]  A. Kruglanski Causal explanation, teleological explanation: On radical particularism in attribution theory. , 1979 .

[29]  M. Rabin,et al.  Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests , 2001 .

[30]  Joyce E. Berg,et al.  Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History , 1995 .

[31]  M. Rabin Published by: American , 2022 .

[32]  S. Zamir,et al.  Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study , 1991 .