Possible worlds semantics is an extremely well-established approach to the semantics of modals, but it faces a range of difficulties for at least certain types of modals, especially deontic modals with their distinction between heavy and light permissions and obligations. This paper outlines a new semantics of modals that aims to overcome some of those difficulties. This semantics is based on an a novel ontology of modal objects, entities like obligations, permissions, needs, epistemic states, abilities, and essences. Moreover, it is based on truthmaking, more precisely the notion of exact truthmaking, in the sense of Fine’s (2014, 2017a, to appear a, b) recent truthmaker semantics. Unlike in Fine’s truthmaker semantics, the notion of exact truthmaking (or satisfaction) is taken to apply not only to sentences, but also to modal objects. Thus, situations or actions may be (exact) truthmakers (or satisfiers) not only of sentences, but also of entities like obligations, permissions, and essences. I will call this object-based truthmaker semantics. Object-based truthmaker semantics applies particularly well to deontic modals, which this paper will focus on. But it is meant to apply to all modals, and it will be indicated how it can generalize. The paper will in particular suggest an application of object-based truthmaker semantics to metaphysical modality based on essences as modal objects. Object-based truthmaker semantics is based on a range of intuitions that are particularly well-reflected in natural language. First, modal objects as such are, at least to an extent, well-reflected in nominalizations of modal predicates such as need, permission, obligation. The semantic behavior of such nominalizations reflects the properties that characterize modal objects as a type of entity of its own distinct from more familiar types of entities such as propositions and states, most importantly the properties of having
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