A Limitation of the Generalized Vickrey Auction in Electronic Commerce: Robustness against False-name Bids
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] T. Sandholm. Limitations of the Vickrey Auction in Computational Multiagent Systems , 1996 .
[2] Ilya Segal,et al. Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green , 1997 .
[3] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server , 1999, AGENTS '00.
[4] E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .
[5] E. Rasmussen. Games and Information , 1989 .
[6] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.
[7] Michael P. Wellman,et al. The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents , 1998, AGENTS '98.
[8] Michael P. Wellman,et al. Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation , 1998, Decis. Support Syst..
[9] Hal R. Varian,et al. Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents , 1995, USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce.
[10] W. K. Vickery,et al. Counter-Speculation Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[11] Pattie Maes,et al. Agent-mediated electronic commerce: a survey , 1998, The Knowledge Engineering Review.
[12] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. Optimal auctions revisited , 1998, Artif. Intell..
[13] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions , 2014 .
[14] Martin P. Loeb,et al. INCENTIVES AND PUBLIC INPUTS , 1975 .
[15] R. McAfee,et al. Analyzing the Airwaves Auction , 1996 .
[16] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[17] Scott H. Clearwater,et al. A Multi-Agent System for Controlling Building Environments , 1995, ICMAS.