论文信息 - APTE: An Algorithm for Proving Trace Equivalence

APTE: An Algorithm for Proving Trace Equivalence

This paper presents APTE, a new tool for automatically proving the security of cryptographic protocols. It focuses on proving trace equivalence between processes, which is crucial for specifying privacy type properties such as anonymity and unlinkability.

Vincent Cheval

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