Repeated Auction Games and Learning Dynamics in Electronic Logistics Marketplaces: Complexity, Bounded Rationality, and Regulation through Information: Insights, Concepts, Applications

Online markets for transportation services, in the form of Internet sites that dynamically match shipments (shippers’ demand) and transportation capacity (carriers’ offer) through auction mechanisms are changing the traditional structure of transportation markets. A general framework for the study of carriers’ behavior in a sequential auction transportation marketplace is provided. The unique characteristics of these marketplaces and the sources of difficulty in analyzing the behavior of these marketplaces are discussed. Bounded rationality, learning, and behavior in a sequential auction marketplace are analyzed and simulated.

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