Optimal D-FACTS Placement in Moving Target Defense Against False Data Injection Attacks

Moving target defense (MTD) is a defense strategy to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against the power system state estimation using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. However, existing studies neglect to address a fundamental yet critical issue, i.e., the D-FACTS placement, by assuming that all lines are equipped with D-FACTS devices. To tackle this problem, we first derive analytical necessary conditions and requirements on the D-FACTS placement for a complete MTD. Further, we propose sufficient conditions using a graph theory-based topology analysis to ensure that the MTD under the proposed D-FACTS placement has the maximum rank of its composite matrix, which is indicative of the MTD effectiveness. Based on the analytical conditions, we design D-FACTS placement algorithms by using the minimum number of D-FACTS devices to achieve the maximum MTD effectiveness. A novel MTD-based ACOPF model, in which the reactance of D-FACTS lines is introduced as decision variables, is proposed to find a trade-off between the system loss and the MTD effectiveness. Numerical results on 6-bus, IEEE 14-bus, and IEEE 118-bus systems show the efficacy of MTDs using the proposed D-FACTS placement algorithms in maximizing the composite matrix rank and detecting FDI attacks.

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