The Frame Problem, Gödelian Incompleteness, and the Lucas-Penrose Argument: A Structural Analysis of Arguments About Limits of AI, and Its Physical and Metaphysical Consequences

The frame problem is a fundamental challenge in AI, and the Lucas-Penrose argument is supposed to show a limitation of AI if it is successful at all. Here we discuss both of them from a unified Godelian point of view. We give an informational reformulation of the frame problem, which turns out to be tightly intertwined with the nature of Godelian incompleteness in the sense that they both hinge upon the finitarity condition of agents or systems, without which their alleged limitations can readily be overcome, and that they can both be seen as instances of the fundamental discrepancy between finitary beings and infinitary reality. We then revisit the Lucas-Penrose argument, elaborating a version of it which indicates the impossibility of information physics or the computational theory of the universe. It turns out through a finer analysis that if the Lucas-Penrose argument is accepted then information physics is impossible too; the possibility of AI or the computational theory of the mind is thus linked with the possibility of information physics or the computational theory of the universe. We finally reconsider the Penrose’s Quantum Mind Thesis in light of recent advances in quantum modelling of cognition, giving a structural reformulation of it and thereby shedding new light on what is problematic in the Quantum Mind Thesis. Overall, we consider it promising to link the computational theory of the mind with the computational theory of the universe; their integration would allow us to go beyond the Cartesian dualism, giving, in particular, an incarnation of Chalmers’ double-aspect theory of information.