Endogenous information and stochastic contracts

A growing literature analyzes revenue-maximizing contracts for situations in which agents can acquire private information before they decide whether to join the contract. It is conjectured that the results also apply to the more natural scenario where information can be acquired either before or after signing. This paper shows that, in fact, the latter scenario is more favorable for the principal. Using stochastic contracts, she can induce information acquisition with some probability and yet appropriate the generated surplus.

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