The Security Architecture of the Java Operating System JX - A Security Architecture for Distributed Parallel Computing

Using the unneeded computation power in the internet for distributed computing is getting more and more eligible. To increase the willingness to provide unneeded computing power, a secure platform is needed for the execution of untrusted code. We present the architecture of the JX operating system, which can be used to safely execute untrusted code. The problem of erroneous agents crashing the system is solved by using Java – a typesafe language – as implementation language. The resource consumption of the agents is controlled by a security manager, that inspects every interaction between an agent and a system service. If the security policy does not approve the use of a system service, the access can be denied. An agent execution system build upon JX is presented to illustrate the security problems occurring and the solutions provided by the operating system JX.

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