论文信息 - Open Access and Academic Journal Quality - 字舞流文

Open Access and Academic Journal Quality

ing from complicated signaling behavior by informed authors. Lerner and Tirole show that adding upstream private information does not alter their basic analysis (their Proposition 4). 454 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2005

Christopher M. Snyder | Mark J. McCabe | M. McCabe

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