A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.

Provides a theory of decision making within business organizations. Contrary to the economic theory of the firm, which sees firms as profit-maximizing entities, the authors advocate a theory based on empirical observation of actual firm decision-making. Various features of firm decision-making are identified. First, firms are coalitions of participants whose individual goals may and often do conflict. How this conflict is resolved is determined by the firm's bargaining process. This process is constrained by past behavior and decisions. Second, the authors reject the notion that firms are one-dimensional profit-maximizers in favor of a view of firms as entities with many different objectives that will accept suboptimal outcomes if they are above a minimum level. Congruent with this, a firm's search activity occurs in response to a perceived problem and is limited in scope. The effect is that firm policies will change only incrementally. Also impeding radical policy change is the fact that firms react to uncertainty using standardized decision rules. Using this theory, two computer models of business decision-making are presented and compared with actual results. These models are shown to have especially good predictive power. (CAR)