Mitigating supply disruption with a backup supplier under uncertain demand: competition vs. cooperation

In case of supply disruption following major disasters, many supply chains tend to break down due to stock-outs and take a long time to recover. However, by keeping emergency sources of supply, some supply chains continue to function smoothly even after a major disaster. In this work, using a game-theoretic-framework, we consider a two-suppliers-one-retailer supply chain with price-dependent stochastic demand in which suppliers are prone to disruption. To investigate the impact of supply disruption we consider two models: SC model, in which the retailer does not maintain any emergency sources of supply against any supply disruption, and SCB model, in which the retailer maintains a backup supplier to mitigate the impact of supply disruption. We mainly focus on the pricing strategies of the suppliers and the mitigating strategies of the retailer under supply and demand uncertainty. We address two coordinating mechanisms to enhance supply chain performance. Our results indicate that in the presence of supply disruption, even with lower probabilities, the retailer would always prefer to take the advantage of a backup supplier and the optimal reserve quantity increases with disruption probabilities. We further investigate the scenario in which the suppliers would always prefer to cooperate with each other.

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