Deniable Authenticated Key Establishment for Internet Protocols

We propose two public-key schemes to achieve “deniable authentication” for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Our protocols can be implemented using different concrete mechanisms and we discuss different options; in particular we suggest solutions based on elliptic curve pairings. The protocol designs use the modular construction method of Canetti and Krawczyk which provides the basis for a proof of security. Our schemes can, in some situations, be more efficient than existing IKE protocols as well as having stronger deniability properties.

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