论文信息 - Decisions by players of comparable strength

Decisions by players of comparable strength

SummaryCommittees are represented by simple games. The strength of the players is not always ordinally scaled. In ballots the strength of the players is (nearly) cardinally scaled (by the number of votes). The size of the gap between ordinally and cardinally scaled strength is examined. Especially in the ordinal case the constant-sum property has a much weaker meaning than in the cardinal case. Examples are constructed for the crucial points.

Axel Ostmann | A. Ostmann

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