Second-order languages and mathematical practice

There are well-known theorems in mathematical logic that indicate rather profound differences between the logic of first-order languages and the logic of second-order languages. In the first-order case, for example, there is Godel's completeness theorem: every consistent set of sentences (vis-a-vis a standard axiomatization) has a model. As a corollary, first-order logic is compact : if a set of formulas is not satisfiable, then it has a finite subset which also is not satisfiable. The downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem is that every set of satisfiable first-order sentences has a model whose cardinality is at most countable (or the cardinality of the set of sentences, whichever is greater), and the upward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem is that if a set of first-order sentences has, for each natural number n , a model whose cardinality is at least n , then it has, for each infinite cardinal κ (greater than or equal to the cardinality of the set of sentences), a model of cardinality κ . It follows, of course, that no set of first-order sentences that has an infinite model can be categorical. Second-order logic, on the other hand, is inherently incomplete in the sense that no recursive, sound axiomatization of it is complete. It is not compact, and there are many well-known categorical sets of second-order sentences (with infinite models). Thus, there are no straightforward analogues to the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems for second-order languages and logic. There has been some controversy in recent years as to whether “second-order logic” should be considered a part of logic, but this boundary issue does not concern me directly, at least not here.