Trade promotion policies in manufacturer-retailer supply chains

This study considers a manufacturer-retailer supply chain in which the manufacturer provides trade promotions the retailer. We compare with four trade promotions (off-invoice, scan-back, unsold-discount and target rebate). Consider the linear price sensitive and uncertain demand, the results indicate that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the unsold-discount policy; only manufacturer benefits from the target rebate policy. However, target rebate can benefit both manufacturer and retailer when the wholesale price is determined within the appropriate range of an agreement. Consider the price-elasticity and uncertain demand, both manufacturer and retailer can only benefit from the target rebate policy.

[1]  Nanda Kumar,et al.  Effectiveness of Trade Promotions: Analyzing the Determinants of Retail Pass Through , 2001 .

[2]  Li Jiang,et al.  Supplier Competition in Decentralized Assembly Systems with Price-Sensitive and Uncertain Demand , 2010, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[3]  D. Bell,et al.  Creating Win-Win Trade Promotions: Theory and Empirical Analysis of Scan-Back Trade Deals , 2003 .

[4]  Xiaohang Yue,et al.  Trade promotion mode choice and information sharing in fashion retail supply chains , 2008 .

[5]  Karsten Hansen,et al.  Channel Pass-Through of Trade Promotions , 2010, Mark. Sci..

[6]  Hong Yuan,et al.  Trade Promotion Decisions Under Demand Uncertainty: A Market Experiment Approach , 2013, Manag. Sci..

[7]  Tsan-Ming Choi,et al.  Supply chain coordination with risk sensitive retailer under target sales rebate , 2011, Autom..

[8]  Terry A. Taylor,et al.  Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects , 2002, Manag. Sci..

[9]  Srinivasan Raghunathan,et al.  Retailer- vs. Vendor-Managed Inventory and Brand Competition , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[10]  Volodymyr Babich,et al.  Competition and Diversification Effects in Supply Chains with Supplier Default Risk , 2006, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[11]  Tieming Liu,et al.  Sales effort free riding and coordination with price match and channel rebate , 2012, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[12]  Guiomar Martín-Herrán,et al.  A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands , 2009, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[13]  Sungchul Choi,et al.  Price competition and store competition: Store brands vs. national brand , 2013, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[14]  Robert C. Blattberg,et al.  Modelling the Effectiveness and Profitability of Trade Promotions , 1987 .

[15]  Tony Haitao Cui,et al.  A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions , 2008, Mark. Sci..

[16]  Subrata Saha,et al.  Supply chain coordination through rebate induced contracts , 2013 .

[17]  W. K. Wong,et al.  Coordinating supply chains with sales rebate contracts and vendor-managed inventory , 2009 .

[18]  Joseph Geunes,et al.  Price promotions, operations cost, and profit in a two-stage supply chain , 2012 .