Market Share Delegation in a Bertrand Duopoly. Synchronisation and Multistability

This paper tackles the issue of local and global analyses of a duopoly game with price competition and market share delegation. The dynamics of the economy is characterised by a differentiable two-dimensional discrete time system. The paper stresses the importance of complementarity between products as a source of synchronisation in the long term, in contrast to the case of their substitutability. This means that when products are complements, players may coordinate their behaviour even if initial conditions are different. In addition, there exist multiple attractors so that even starting with similar conditions may end up generating very different dynamic patterns.

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