Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulernability to Manipulation

Measuring the ease of manipulation{deviating from reporting truthfully{ is a central issue in social choice, mechanism design and game theory. This paper introduces a new measure of the ease of manipulation for direct mechanisms based on the following idea:

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