Information Assurance and Open Architecture Integrated Modular Avionics

The integrated modular avionics (IMA) approach to avionics employs a complex system of systems (SoS) to realize military and/or aerospace solutions. When the IMA architecture is augmented with SoS-wide security features, it is difficult to analyze its information assurance (IA) properties, unless there is some rigor applied to the process. This paper addresses the difficulties associated with analyzing IA properties in a notional IMA architecture that requires them. A whole-part compositional approach is taken in the analysis methods utilized herein in order to mitigate the complexities of otherwise necessary holistic methods.

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