Optimal false-name-proof single-item redistribution mechanisms
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Makoto Yokoo | Shunsuke Tsuruta | Masaaki Oka | Taiki Todo | Yujiro Kawasaki | Mingyu Guo | Yuko Sakurai | M. Yokoo | M. Guo | Taiki Todo | Y. Sakurai | Yujiro Kawasaki | Masaaki Oka | Shunsuke Tsuruta
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