Coercion-resistance as Opacity in Voting Systems

Coercion-resistance is one of the key requirements of voting systems as it prevents an outsider from trying to persuade the voter to vote in a certain way. Although it usually implies receipt-freeness [15], it is usually formalised as a stronger property [23]. In this paper we analyse two voting schemes for coercion-resistance, namely Pret a Voter [12] and FOO [17], and find that many of the requirements can be expressed in terms of a fairly recent security property, opacity [5]. We then present a new formalisation of coercion-resistance by casting it as opacity. © 2006 University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Printed and published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. Bibliographical details PEACOCK, T., RYAN, P. Y. A.. Coercion-resistance as Opacity in Voting Systems [By] T. Peacock, P. Y. A. Ryan. Newcastle upon Tyne: University of Newcastle upon Tyne: Computing Science, 2006. (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-959)

[1]  C. A. R. Hoare,et al.  Communicating sequential processes , 1978, CACM.

[2]  David Chaum,et al.  Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete , 1985, CACM.

[3]  Moni Naor,et al.  Bit Commitment Using Pseudo-Randomness , 1989, CRYPTO.

[4]  Moni Naor,et al.  Non-malleable cryptography , 1991, STOC '91.

[5]  Atsushi Fujioka,et al.  A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections , 1992, AUSCRYPT.

[6]  Josh Benaloh,et al.  Receipt-Free Secret-Ballot Elections , 1994, STOC 1994.

[7]  Kazue Sako,et al.  Receipt-Free Mix-Type Voting Scheme - A Practical Solution to the Implementation of a Voting Booth , 1995, EUROCRYPT.

[8]  Steve A. Schneider,et al.  CSP and Anonymity , 1996, ESORICS.

[9]  Rafail Ostrovsky,et al.  Deniable Encryption , 1997, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[10]  Markus Jakobsson,et al.  Designated Verifier Proofs and Their Applications , 1996, EUROCRYPT.

[11]  Tatsuaki Okamoto,et al.  An electronic voting scheme , 1996, IFIP World Conference on IT Tools.

[12]  Tatsuaki Okamoto,et al.  Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Schemes for Large Scale Elections , 1997, Security Protocols Workshop.

[13]  Kazue Sako,et al.  Efficient Receipt-Free Voting Based on Homomorphic Encryption , 2000, EUROCRYPT.

[14]  C. Andrew Neff,et al.  A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting , 2001, CCS '01.

[15]  Jacques Stern,et al.  Practical multi-candidate election system , 2001, PODC '01.

[16]  Martín Abadi,et al.  Mobile values, new names, and secure communication , 2001, POPL '01.

[17]  Markus Jakobsson,et al.  Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking , 2002, USENIX Security Symposium.

[18]  C. Andrew Ne,et al.  Practical high certainty intent verification for encrypted votes , 2004 .

[19]  Maciej Koutny,et al.  Modelling Dynamic Opacity Using Petri Nets with Silent Actions , 2004, Formal Aspects in Security and Trust.

[20]  David Chaum,et al.  Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections , 2004, IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine.

[21]  Maciej Koutny,et al.  Modelling Opacity Using Petri Nets , 2005, WISP@ICATPN.

[22]  Mark Ryan,et al.  Receipt-freeness : formal definition and fault attacks ( Extended Abstract ) , 2005 .

[23]  David Chaum,et al.  A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme , 2005, ESORICS.

[24]  Michael R. Clarkson,et al.  Coercion-Resistant Remote Voting using Decryption Mixes , 2005 .

[25]  David A. Wagner,et al.  Cryptographic Voting Protocols: A Systems Perspective , 2005, USENIX Security Symposium.

[26]  Markus Jakobsson,et al.  Coercion-resistant electronic elections , 2005, WPES '05.

[27]  Mark Ryan,et al.  Analysis of an Electronic Voting Protocol in the Applied Pi Calculus , 2005, ESOP.

[28]  Peter Y. A. Ryan,et al.  Prêt à Voter : a Systems Perspective , 2005 .

[29]  Peter Y. A. Ryan,et al.  Prêt à Voter with Re-encryption Mixes , 2006, ESORICS.

[30]  Mark Ryan,et al.  Coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in electronic voting , 2006, 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06).

[31]  Maciej Koutny,et al.  Opacity generalised to transition systems , 2005, International Journal of Information Security.