The Shapley Value

Preface 1. Introduction to the Shapley value Alvin E. Roth Part I. Ancestral Papers: 2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley 3. A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations: 4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth 5. The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D. Straffin, Jr. 6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet 7. Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber 8. Combinatorial representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs Uriel G. Rothblum 9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell 10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen Part III. Coalitions: 11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz 12. Endogenous formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson Part IV. Large Games: 13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R. Zame 14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep Dubley and Abraham Neyman 15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman 16. Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-Francois Mertens Part V. Cost Allocation and Fair Division: 17. Individual contribution and just compensation H. P. Young 18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair Tauman Part VI. NTU Games: 19. Utility comparison and the theory of games Lloyd S. Shapley 20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler, Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.

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