How to Build a Foundational Ontology: The Object-Centered High-level Reference Ontology OCHRE

Foundational ontologies are axiomatic accounts of high-level domain-independent categories about the real world. They constitute toolboxes of reusable information modeling primitives for building application ontologies in specific domains. As such, they enhance semantic interoperability between agents by specifying descriptively adequate shared conceptualisations. The design of foundational ontologies gives rise to completely new challenges in respect of their content as well as their formalisation. Indeed, their underlying modeling options correspond to the ontological choices discussed in classical metaphysics as well as in the research on qualitative reasoning. Building a foundational ontology is thus an eminently interdisciplinary task. As a case study, this article sketches the formalisation of the Object-Centered High-level REference ontology OCHRE, emphasising in particular the problem of achieving formal simplicity within the limits of descriptive adequacy.

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