Michael Dummett on Social Choice and Voting

Michael Dummett worked on the theoretical aspects of aggregation of individual preferences and on the strategic aspects of voting theory. He also extended Black’s analysis of single-peaked preferences for majority rule to the case of voting games (majority games), offering a greater flexibility for the expression of voters’ preferences. He is also with Donald Saari one of the major advocates of the use of Borda’s rule in actual voting. In two books and a paper, he proposed many examples showing the advantages and defects of many voting rules used in the world

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