The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game.

Society uses the following game to decide on the supply of a public good. Each agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected and the good is supplied whenever total contributions exceed a threshold. We study the case where the public good is excludable, agents have a common value and each agent receives a private signal about the common value. This game models a standard crowdfunding setting as it is executed in popular crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo. We study how well crowdfunding performs from the firm's perspective, in terms of market penetration, and how it performs from the perspective of society, in terms of efficiency.

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