Verification of the biological weapons convention: What is needed?

The lack of transparency and verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is one factor behind the current weakening of the ban on biological weapons. Despite recent setbacks, governments need to fill the verification gap so that violations of the BWC can be detected and deterred. Continued talks on a strong verification mechanism for the BWC should aim for an open verification regime and one that is flexible enough to adapt to new technical and political circumstances. Effective monitoring of compliance with the BWC will require concerted effort by governments and civil society.

[1]  A. Ramsay,et al.  Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox , 2001, Journal of Virology.

[2]  Trevor Findlay.  1 Introduction : the salience and future of verification , 2000 .

[3]  R Nowak.  Disaster in the making. , 2001, New scientist.

[4]  Yahya Dehqanzada,et al.  Secrets for sale: How commercial satellite imagery will change the world , 2000 .

[5]  Julian Perry Robinson,et al.  A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons Under International Criminal Law , 2002 .

[6]  Harald Müller,et al.  Compliance politics: A critical analysis of multilateral arms control treaty enforcement , 2000 .

[7]  Eliot A. Cohen,et al.  Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity , 1999 .

[8]  Jonathan B. Tucker.  The Utility of Sampling and Analysis for Compliance Monitoring of the Biological Weapons Convention , 1998 .

[9]  Oliver Meier.  Bioweapons Treaty: Neither trust nor verify, says U.S. , 2001 .

[10]  Marie Isabelle Chevrier.  The Biological Weapons Convention: the protocol that almost was , 2001 .

[11]  Nicholas A. Sims.  The case for a BWC committee of oversight: draft mandate and commentary , 2001 .

[12]  Nicholas Roger Alan Sims.  The evolution of biological disarmament , 2001 .

[13]  Oliver Meier.  Neither trust nor verify, says U.S. , 2001 .

[14]  Michael Moodie,et al.  The Soviet Union, Russia, and the biological and toxin weapons convention , 2001 .

[15]  M. Wheelis,et al.  Investigating disease outbreaks under a protocol to the biological and toxin weapons convention. , 2000, Emerging infectious diseases.

[16]  Iris Hunger,et al.  Confidence‐building measures for the BTWC: Performance and potential , 2000 .

[17]  Stephen Black.  Unscom and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Contro , 1999 .

[18]  Graham S. Pearson.  Discriminating Triggers for Mandatory Declarations , 1997 .

[19]  Seth Bullock,et al.  THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PROTOCOL: POLITICS, SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY , 2003 .